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Abstract: The last weeks of 1989 concluded a year of turmoil in Eastern 
Europe and the fall of communist regimes.  For a significant portion of the 
French population the direction of European communism was relevant not 
only to the European political landscape but to their own beliefs and 
identities. In Western Europe and America, the press heralded the 1989 
communist collapses in Eastern Europe, from groundbreaking Polish 
elections in June to the fall of the Berlin wall in November, as great 
victories in the struggle against communism.  But relying upon the English 
speaking press alone to examine Cold War era events provides a 
misleading image of how Western countries viewed Communist states and 
the events which led to their collapse.   
The political climate in America and Britain was highly 
conservative; however, the political right did not hold as strong a position 
in other Western nations, even those in the NATO alliance. In places such 
as Italy and France, viable Communist parties and strong leftist 
movements existed along with press outlets which represented their ideas 
and those of a constituency which took a less straightforward view of the 
West’s moral position. The French Communist Party (PCF) achieved 
some degree of electoral success throughout the Cold War.  The collapse 
of Communist governments and ensuing dramatic power shifts raised a 
number of questions about the French left which my article considers.  
How did Communists and Socialists in France, view the fall of states who 
espoused, in theory, the forms of government and social management their 
own parties advocated?  And how did the Socialist and Communist parties 
in France relate to their ideological counterparts in Eastern Europe?   
This article employs French newspapers, political journals, and party 
communications to discuss the French left’s expectations for the future of 
communism in Eastern Europe, their views on the revolutions of 1989, and 
their hopes and fears for the future of Eastern Europe as the political 
climate evolved. 
 
1 Introduction 
This headline from L’Humanite, the French Communist 
Party’s newspaper, asked an important question about the 
future of communism in Europe as the last weeks of 1989 
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concluded a year of turmoil in Eastern Europe and the fall of 
communist regimes.  For a significant portion of the French 
population the direction of European communism was 
relevant not only to the European political landscape but to 
their own beliefs and identities. In Western Europe and 
America, the press heralded the 1989 communist collapses 
in Eastern Europe, from groundbreaking Polish elections in 
June to the fall of the Berlin wall in November, as great 
victories in the struggle against communism.  Governments 
in Great Britain and The United States celebrated these 
events as the beginning of the end of the Cold War and 
indications of communism’s inability to provide a stable and 
enduring form of government.  But relying upon the English 
speaking press alone to examine Cold War era events 
provides a misleading image of how Western countries 
viewed Communist states and the events which led to their 
collapse.   
The political climate in America and Britain was highly 
conservative, and the leaders of these states during the 
1980s, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher led the 
conservative parties of those countries which promoted a 
public view of the Soviet Union and communism as 
opponents of the west and enemies of freedom.  However, the 
political right did not hold as strong a position in other 
Western nations, even those in the NATO alliance. In places 
such as Italy and France, viable Communist parties and 
strong leftist movements existed along with press outlets 
which represented their ideas and those of a constituency 
which took a less straightforward view of the West’s moral 
position. 
  In France, the Communist Party (PCF) achieved some 
degree of electoral success throughout the Cold War, 
receiving between eighteen and twenty-six percent of the vote 
in legislative elections between 1945 and 1978. And in the 
1980s, the PCF formed part of Francois Mitterrand’s ruling 
coalition along with the Socialist Party (PS) (Elgie, 2000).     
Events in Eastern Europe were well covered and portended a 
fundamental change in the political landscape of Europe.   
The collapse of Communist governments and ensuing 
dramatic power shifts raised a number of questions about 
the French left which will be considered here.  How did 
Communists and Socialists in France, accustomed to 
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holding their own in a representative government, view the 
fall of states who espoused, in theory, the forms of 
government and social management their own parties 
advocated?  And how did the Socialist and Communist 
parties in France relate to their ideological counterparts in 
Eastern Europe?  This study will also examine how the 
French left viewed itself in the greater context of European 
politics in the wake of communism’s collapse in Eastern 
Europe. These questions beg another: how did a 
Socialist/Communist coalition which led a nuclear armed 
Western power manage to make sense of participation in an 
alliance openly opposed to Communist Eastern Europe?   
This article will discuss the French leftists’ expectations for 
the future of communism in Eastern Europe, their views on 
the revolutions of 1989, and their hopes and fears for the 
future of Eastern Europe as the political climate evolved. 
 
2. Left Parties in Cold War France 
Despite their popularity in post-World War II France the 
parties of the French left, the strongest of which were the 
Socialist Party and the French Communist Party, never held 
power before until the 1980s. This changed in 1981, when 
Mitterrand’s coalition formed a government in which the 
Socialist party led while the Communist party acted as a 
junior partner.  The PCF actually achieved its highest levels 
of membership in the 1970s.  However, with the coalition, 
the PCF formed part of the ruling government for the first 
time, and served in the ruling coalition from 1981 to 1984.  
Despite the resignation of PCF ministers over economic 
policy disputes in 1984, the party maintained a fragile 
friendship with the PS while the Socialist coalition held sway 
in France until later in the decade when a centre-right 
coalition and its Prime Ministers shared power with 
Mitterrand, the Socialist President, in a split government 
situation referred to as “cohabitation.”  Analysis of this 
period shows how the strength of ruling coalitions relied on 
pragmatic centrists as much as left or right wing ideologues 
(Friend, 1989). Not only were French left politicians 
confronted by a changing list of issues and challenges 
internationally, but support for the left was also radically 
altered by the decline of European communism and the 
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dissolution of the Soviet government which had taken an 
active interest in French politics, including funding the PCF 
newspaper L’Humanite. 
  The PCF possessed a broad constituency which 
spanned most regions prior to the Second World War. The 
maintenance of a competitive Communist party in France 
during the Cold War is not entirely surprising given the 
strong history of the PCF and the general politics of France 
during the 20th century (Boswell, 1993).   French 
Communists were particularly associated with the French 
Resistance against Nazi Germany and opposition to the 
Vichy French government.  Despite remaining quiet while the 
Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact held, French communists 
entered the resistance en masse following the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union and managed to emphasize their 
participation in the years following (Friend, 1999).   
Furthermore, France’s situation following the war did not 
inherently push her into even a tacit alliance against the 
Soviet Union.  Many in France, including the influential and 
right of center Charles de Gaulle, had little interest in 
entering a new global conflict.  While France was a valuable 
ally of the United States and Britain in many aspects of the 
Cold War, the refusal of French governments to fully 
cooperate with the NATO alliance during the Cold War 
reflected a political culture more open to socialist and 
communist movements.   
The PCF maintained strong political and philosophical 
ties to the Soviet Union, eschewing the nation-specific ideas 
of Euro-communism popular in Italy and Spain (except for a 
brief period in the mid-70s) which defied the notion of one 
ideal form of communism, instead stressing the importance 
of local conditions and cultural traditions.  However, the 
party was conflicted when forced to choose between an 
ideological stand against undemocratic states and support 
for communist countries.  Sometimes these disagreements 
reflected an honest ideological quandary in which the French 
could not resolve their beliefs with complete support for the 
USSR.  For example, the PCF favored Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan for several years, though Andre Leplat of the 
PCF Central Committee described the eventual withdrawal 
as “a victory for Soviet Union and diplomacy” rather than the 
result of military setbacks (LePlatt, 1988). The PCF’s 
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operations during the Cold War required constant juggling of 
international loyalties and ideology with domestic political 
relevance (Ross, 1992).   Perhaps the most striking example 
of their situation is that while the PCF entered government 
in coalition with Mitterrand’s Socialists, the Soviet Union 
had supported the more centrist Valéry Giscard d'Estaing for 
President.  Despite the paradox of the Soviet Union opposing 
the leader of a French Left coalition, Soviet officials 
distrusted the politically savvy Mitterrand and his 
friendliness with American leaders, opting instead for the 
strongly independent d’Estaing.  The PCF’s often public 
distaste for Mitterrand reflected the pragmatic basis of the 
left alliance (Morray, 1997). 
  While the participation of the PCF in French 
government and the positive results of détente were 
encouraging signs for the future of European communism, 
the collapse of the Soviet bloc might not have been entirely 
unexpected given the overall history of the Cold War. 
Certainly events prior to the late 1980s are central to 
understanding how the left developed and the post-Cold War 
era formed, but the reaction of the French left in 1989 is still 
highly relevant.  The presence of hope and optimism does 
not reveal stunning ignorance of the political situation 
despite how some strong statements may appear in 
hindsight.  For example, the image of PCF representative 
Pierre Blotin attending the annual meetings of the Romanian 
Party Congress days before the downfall of Ceausescu in 
December and declaring the events of the year to be but “a 
crisis of development in communism” does not fully 
represent the French left.  In assemblies of left political 
parties, the reports of party journalists, and the speculation 
of intellectuals, members of the French left discussed the 
worldwide ramifications of 1989 and what changes in the 
East meant for the future of communism (Ross, 1992).  
 
3.  Not Revolution, but Communist Reformation 
The French left recognized the real need and 
possibility for positive changes in Eastern European 
communist governments. As the Soviet leadership of Mikhail 
Gorbachev pursued reforms for Eastern Europe, a new era 
was approaching and the French left certainly did not watch 
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idly as the events of 1989 unfolded.  Potential results of 
these reforms were hotly debated.   Economic disparities 
between East and West were apparent.  These disparities 
were seen to reflect deep-seeded problems and a society 
which had failed to minimize economic stratification.   
However, the vision of an Eastern bloc reforming socialism 
for a better future was compelling, and leftist publications 
indicate a strong hope for the future, despite obvious 
dangers.  The general umbrella of Perestroika often appears 
as a description of this reform spirit, representing the Soviet 
system’s evolution embodied by Gorbachev. Amongst 
themselves, the leadership of the PCF often questioned the 
direction of Soviet reform: long-serving party leader Georges 
Marchais was much more skeptical at party conferences 
than in his public pronouncements (Dupin, 1989).  However 
the PCF decided, following heavy debate, to officially support 
Gorbachev’s reforms (Mir, 1989).   
Many communists, along with socialists and other 
leftists, were eager for change and interested in a more 
efficient, less authoritarian East. Even the most left wing 
publications did not suggest Gorbachev was the harbinger of 
Soviet collapse, though this is not particularly surprising in 
the specific case of L’Humanite given Soviet funding of the 
PCF.  Instead, analysis of Eastern reforms tends to 
emphasize the forward movement of Soviet Communism in 
directions which would avoid open capitalism.  Writing in 
October of 1989, Jean-Marie Chauvier, editor of Le Monde 
Diplomatique, insisted that Soviet changes in policy were part 
of reforming Communism (Chavier, 1989).  This approach 
envisioned the endeavors as a massive housekeeping project, 
long overdue in some respects, working to turn an 
antiquated but inherently good system into a modernized 
one which would limit corruption and allow for greater 
participation. 
  Within the context of necessary reform, the French left 
could appreciate the Gorbachev government as well as some 
of the popular movements in Eastern Europe.  Gorbachev 
himself could strike an effective dialog with the French 
government and leave the French people with a positive 
impression.  He was generally popular with the French 
public in addition to political leaders (“Des Francais” 1989) 
and his July 1989 visit to France in which he conferred with 
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Mitterrand and visited the Bastille was met with excitement 
from the public and an enthusiastic welcome from the PCF 
(“Bonjour Mikhail” 1989).  His willingness to confer with 
Western leaders and the progress made in these meetings, 
captured headlines which represented Gorbachev as a figure 
of progress interested in working with the French on 
European matters leading to greater openness and collective 
mediation of the changing continental climate (“M. 
Gorbachev” 1989). 
  Election reforms in Eastern Europe especially 
appealed to the French left.  Of particular interest was the 
prospect of wider and more authentic representation in 
Eastern European governments.  This did not necessarily 
entail separatism; however, French Communists considered 
representative government an important tool for preserving 
the Soviet Union and improving the Eastern bloc by 
promoting communication and allowing diversity to unify 
rather than divide (Sage, 1989).  Communist journalist Jean-
Paul Pierot, wrote in the December 19th edition of   
L’Humanite on the struggles following the collapse of 
communist rule in Romania that despite the rightwing 
nationalists there were equally or more likely to ignore 
individual liberties than the former communist regime and 
stated unequivocally that “liberty and democracy are 
inseparable from socialism” (Pierot, 1989, December 19).       
The difficulties of nationalism could be troubling; however 
nationalism was not a new phenomenon in Europe, though 
the PCF and many on the left considered it a persistent 
problem to be overcome (Ferro “L’Union” 1989).  Election 
procedures and legitimate parliaments could be an effective 
step towards curbing the authoritarian tendencies of 
European communist states which had made Western 
support difficult.  Symbolic gestures such as the 
rehabilitation of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s writings by the 
Soviet government suggested an atmosphere more open to 
dissident voices (Briancon, 1989). Within three months of 
this symbolic act, PCF journalist Serge Leyrac, known for a 
series of articles denouncing Solzhenitsyn and a campaign 
which characterized Solzhenitsyn’s writings as part of a 
general anti-Soviet conspiracy (Bell & Criddle, 1994), wrote 
that reforms in the Soviet Union leading to greater 
representation and elections had the potential to “bring 
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modern politics to the Soviet Union” (Leyrac, 1989). The PCF 
often connected ideas of democracy with modernity in 
explaining the future of Soviet politics.  Voting would bring 
the Soviet people out of historical backwardness and 
Democratic reforms would allow them to improve the existing 
system, pursuing a more efficient communism (“Socialisme 
un Moderne” 1989) 
  Leftist supporters of reform also valued new policies 
which would improve weak Eastern European economies. 
Greater representation could itself act as an agent for 
economic improvement.  French socialists and communists 
saw democracy as a method for the working classes to better 
express their needs, allowing governments to make more 
informed economic decisions.  The PCF welcomed fiscal 
stimulus plans and new economic ventures, aware of the 
system’s weaknesses while still opposed to full-blown 
capitalism (Leyrac 1989, August 10). Polls taken amidst the 
revolutions of late 1989 indicated the French people saw the 
Soviet Union’s primary problems as economic, above and 
beyond the acknowledged unfairness of Soviet government.  
Liberation’s October 1989 poll asked responders to rank 
what they believed were the primary cause or causes of 
citizen’s grievances in the Soviet Union.  The number one 
response was economic problems (52%) followed by human 
rights issues (35%) and restriction of freedom of expression 
(20%) with the communist ideology/regime itself in fourth 
(12%) (“L’URSS” 1989).  If the economy could be improved 
through a more democratic and open Soviet society then all 
of these concerns could be alleviated either directly through 
legislation or indirectly through a more prosperous society 
which would reflect well upon the communist system. 
Beyond symbolic acts, the Soviet government’s concrete 
policy changes indicated a willingness to pursue 
representative government.  The establishment of regional 
assemblies raised some concern due to their potential 
encouragement of nationalist parties in the Soviet border 
republics.  However, even the PCF viewed these new 
democratic bodies as necessary tests for perestroika 
(Frederick, 1989). 
  Modernization and reform could be accomplished with 
political compromise.  Allowing greater political expression 
would improve economies and incorporate the better ideas of 
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the opposition without fundamentally changing the 
philosophy of a socialist/communist state.  In all the satellite 
states, reform could make socialism more effective without 
abandoning the ideal of a communist future.  The PCF’s 
support for this view appears in an October L’Humanite front 
page article which considers the ramifications of Hungarian 
reforms leading to a victory for the left over false communism 
(“Compromis a Budapest” 1989).  This opinion was not 
confined to the PCF; the leftist paper Liberation, most closely 
associated with the Socialist Party, also described the 
Hungarian reforms as a rejection of authoritarian 
communism leading to the democratic establishment of a 
strong socialist party (“Budapest enterre” 1989). 
Encouraging writers on the left promoted a vision of stable 
change.   
  The PCF noted the “acceptance” of reform and 
compromise by the existing government.  For example in 
Poland, as the labor movement Solidarity gained a place in 
the Polish government, cautious leftists emphasized 
compromise over revolution.  L’Humanite  journalist Claude 
Marchaud called the result of the June 1989 Polish 
elections, in which approximately one-third of seats in the 
legislature were open to popular voting, “A New Coalition” 
which would settle crises instead of a revolutionary 
movement disestablishing Communism (Marchaud, 1989, 
August 18)  This appraisal of the political situation described 
the Polish communist leader General Jaruzelski as 
supporting the need for more representative government 
(Pierot, 1989, July 22)  In fact, when Solidarity established 
the coalition, L’Humanite described “Le Forcing de Walesa” in 
which Solidarity leader Lech Walesa was, according to the 
PCF, compelled by public opinion to form a grand alliance of 
parties from all sides (“Le Forcing” 1989).  The keys to such 
compromise governments, from the French perspective, were 
that they not become dependent on anti-communism, and 
they avoid the indecision inherent in multi-party 
parliamentary democracy, particularly in these cases where 
parties, coalitions, and procedures were being invented on 
the spot (Marchaud, 1989, August 11).   
Compromise and coalition in Eastern European 
governments was a message embraced across the French 
left.  Besides allowing for the preservation of the local 
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communist establishment’s better institutions in Eastern 
European countries, a middle ground promised stability.   
According to this concept, the success of reformists must be 
tempered by the realization that power, having been gained, 
ought be exercised to solve serious problems the citizens of 
Eastern Europe faced on a basic economic level and the 
states’ foreign debt crises (“La Pologne” 1989). Given the 
rioting, upheaval, and nationalist revival in Eastern Europe 
fear of instability was natural, particularly for the left which 
could sense the potential for either a sudden East-West 
military crises, or a general backlash against socialism and 
communism in the wake of a dramatic conclusion to the 
Cold War.  Thus, delay and confusion in the East were met 
with dire concern in France (Vodak, 1989).  However, there 
was little question of returning to more direct Soviet control.   
  French leftists could point to many reasons why 
reform did not equate to revolution in Eastern Europe. In 
September of 1989, following the summer of Polish elections 
and coalition building, General Secretary of the French 
Communist Party George Marchais led a session of the PCF 
Central Committee in which the party decided to support 
Polish reforms, despite the perceived, and very real, 
influence of the Catholic Church as well as Western 
capitalists in encouraging Solidarity.  The committee excused 
these influences by describing the Polish situation as a 
matter complicated by the nation’s culture.  Church 
influence and other distasteful factors were explained as the 
product of rural agrarian Polish traditions.  The committee 
reaffirmed that socialism would prove superior to capitalism 
so there would be little need to worry (Loval, 1989).  A 
traditional, Catholic, Polish culture also served as a fine 
scapegoat when needed.  Pope John Paul II’s meetings in 
Rome with Lech Walesa were a significant event in the 
drama of 1989.  To L’Humanite correspondant Jean-Pierre 
Delahaye, the visits showed Walesa’s reliance on the Catholic 
Church and a cowardly retreat, to “play at debauchery,” from 
the economic turmoil in Poland (Delahaye, 1989). 
   Whatever the PCF would attribute to culture, one idea 
appears unaffected by regional variations in tradition: the 
superiority of socialism over capitalism, with an implied 
movement towards “real” communism.  In addition to 
Soviets, Hungarians, and Poles, elections would help East 
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Germans too.  Besides, these reforms supposedly had the 
full support of Moscow (Marchaud, 1989, October 13) and, 
when given a choice, the PCF believed most people would 
vote for socialists or communists, due to the obvious 
superiority of the left in facilitating social equality (“Pret un 
Diologue” 1989).  Perhaps the most striking expression of 
confidence in the perseverance of communism came in 
December, after the fall of the Berlin wall and so many 
revolutions, Jean-Marie Domenach, author and vocal leftist 
Catholic, wrote in “Ich bin ein Ost-Berliner” that whatever 
the results of governments and flaws in communist states, 
“the ideals of communism are the ideals of freedom” and 
therefore the ideology cannot perish since humanity 
naturally seeks freedom (Domenach, 1989). 
  Thus, in several ways the tone of the press and the left 
was one of anticipation but also reassurance.  On July 
4,1989 Le Monde, the French newspaper of record, released 
a poll which indicated forty-seven percent of the French 
public saw Soviet reforms as marking a significant and 
lasting change in the system. While this figure was the 
headline, the remaining fifty-three percent saw the reforms 
as temporary, minor, or insignificant change.  indicating a 
lingering skepticism which, in light of the events and 
duration of the Cold War, is easily understood.   Even in the 
summer of 1989, there were many reasons to agree with the 
French professor of Russian history Marc Ferro that “the 
Soviet Union has not burst” and the near future would not 
portend such a dramatic occurrence (Ferro, “L’Union” 1989). 
4. The German Question 
Germany was an important component of any scheme 
for reformed communism and closer East-West ties. The 
potential for greater cooperation between East and West 
inspired much enthusiasm from the French left. Soviet 
reform raised the possibility of greater cooperation between 
Eastern Europe, France, and the greater European 
community. Whatever the result, there was much evidence of 
a changing international situation and the French left could 
make use of closer communication with the Soviet Union to 
solve the potential problems the reforms themselves would 
create.  Certainly the economic changes in Eastern Europe 
would require significant changes in French policy to 
ISSN (PRINT): 1944-1088 Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences ISSN (ELECTRONIC): 1944-1096
http://www.japss.org    
 
    
    
 
    
    
Michael Lejman, M.A., University of Mephis 
    
 
213 
 
accommodate and help countries formerly dependent 
entirely upon Soviet support and political decision-making.  
And a united Germany would be most immediate economic 
and political force France would react to in a changing 
Europe. However, changes to the Central European balance 
of power were of particular importance to both the French 
left and the French people in general.  The possibility of a 
reunified Germany elicited a mixture of support and 
apprehension even in those supportive of the West German 
government and its efforts to improve relations with East 
Germany.   
 
  Beyond the necessary risks associated with potential 
capitalist influence, the subject of Germany presented the 
one potential divisive issue amongst leftists generally united 
in their support of more open communication. Despite 
apprehension, as West German initiatives reached out to 
East Germany the French left was approving, particularly on 
the basis of disarmament (Gorce, 1989).  The discussion of 
demilitarization as an essential step made the prospect of 
reunification more palatable.  Messages of peace and a 
potentially quiet end to the Cold War, by the standards of 
twentieth century conflicts, appealed across factional lines 
on the c enter  and l eft.  Further  in fav or of any movem ent 
towards demilitarization, particularly in Central Europe, was 
the strong American presence in Germany (Klein, 1989).   
Certainly any action which would clearly lessen American 
involvement in Europe was worth consideration by French 
intellectuals and politicians.  Furthermore a friendly 
approach from West Germany on the basis of peace might 
also make the implementation of needed reforms smoother, 
preserving the merits of the East German system rather than 
destroying the founding principles of communism (Gorce, 
1989). The East German regime of Eric Honecker did not 
appear a likely candidate for compromise and gradual 
reform, however.  Honecker was considered a holdover 
Stalinist whose philosophies the Soviet Union itself had 
evolved beyond (Adler, 1989). Meanwhile Berlin represented 
an issue more incendiary than anything else in the Soviet 
bloc due to then strong Western presence in West Berlin 
which placed military forces and civilian populations of East 
and West in close, and tense, proximity.  Signs of détente 
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were encouraging, and Honecker’s October visit to Denmark 
served as an important symbol of a more open East German 
foreign relations (Marchaud, 1989, October 12).  Yet, this 
failed to totally ameliorate concerns over the effects of a 
reunited Germany on the continental power structure.  
 
  The real potential for German reunification unearthed 
bad memories which French political discourse voiced.     
Fears of resurgent nationalism might be considered and 
dismissed academically in the case of breakaway Soviet 
republics which were far away from French borders. But in 
the case of Germany and Eastern Europe the potential threat 
of strong nationalist movements installing undemocratic 
ethnically homogenous governments was certainly real as 
reflected in leftist criticism of reform.  The PCF rather 
consistently decried violence and turmoil during the Soviet 
Republics’ demonstrations in 1990, characterizing riots and 
ethnic violence as either the result of nationalist extremism 
or signs of a totalitarian nationalist revival to come (“Le File” 
1990).   
 
Again the issue of stability was paramount, of 
maintaining France’s position in relation to the rest of 
Europe.  In the case of a reunited Germany, fear of 
authoritarians and fascist nationalism were direct, evoking 
memories of Franco-German conflict in the 19th century and 
during the World Wars.  The PCF did not condemn 
reunification outright, appreciating the potential for a more 
peaceful political environment with less American military 
presence.  However, the December 8th edition of L’Humanite 
featured a large article “Bonn weighs on the East” worrying 
that Helmut Kohl’s particular reunification plan could 
destabilize Europe.  More telling than this article was its 
placement.  A story on Asian economic investments entitled 
“Kamikaze” ran in a sidebar on the same page, combining 
with the story of German political moves to provide a not so 
subtle reminder of World War Two era fanaticism and 
aggression (George, 1989). 
 
Worried French writers feared that the economic 
success of West Germany combined with the future potential 
of a reformed East Germany could result in German 
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dominance of Europe from a strong economic and political 
center.  Commentaries on German ambitions included 
expressions of concern that West Germany would do more to 
exploit the East than to integrate East Germany into a new 
framework (Moureau, 1989). Long-serving L’Humanite 
journalist Okba Lamrani took a more direct approach to the 
subject of potential German economic power with the 
provocatively titled “Mark Uber Alles” in which Lamrani 
envisioned a European continent transformed into a massive 
German currency zone (Lamrani, 1989).  The potential for a 
united Germany highlighted the need for Europe to develop a 
more effective dialog amongst nations and to avoid future 
rounds of dominance by one or two major powers.  A closer 
relationship between the Soviet Union and Western 
European countries could keep the playing field of Europe 
from tilting towards the middle (Hentsch, 1989).  The 
strength of this view is reflected in the quiet diplomacy of 
President Mitterrand who attempted to delay German 
reunification. However, Mitterrand’s fears of reunification 
reflected a general suspicion of major changes, leading him 
to overly cautious positions on the legality of the 1991 coup 
in Russia, which he did not condemn publicly, and the 
expansion of the EU, which he wished to move slowly with 
careful analysis of the new Eastern European regimes 
(Kaplan, 2003).     
 
 
5. Towards a Better, Stronger, Closer Europe 
 
The French left generally welcomed greater 
participation of the Soviet bloc countries in the European 
community.  The far left supported the Soviet Union’s new 
willingness to publicly meet and deal with Western leaders. 
The same held true for the French government.  As 
important a figure as Mitterrand was to the French left 
politically, he often played the role of centrist.  With his 
meetings with Gorbachev and natural talents for 
compromise, Mitterrand could scarcely do more to encourage 
open communications between East and West.  In February 
1989, Le Monde Diplomatique took a stand in favor of greater 
communication with an emphasis on open public dialog.   
The journal strictly communicated this message as one of 
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peace and openness, detente without the prospect of 
revolution (“L’Avant Garde” 1989). With open communication 
and the potential for reform, some saw the possibility of truly 
bringing the Soviet Union into a European sphere which had 
developed, admittedly more intellectually than militarily or 
economically, independent from American dominance.   
  The message of most French politicians on the left and 
in the center was that closer communication with the Soviet 
Union would strengthen Europe as a whole.  The potential 
economic benefits of perestroika could not only improve the 
Soviet Union but open a massive population lacking in 
quality infrastructure and important goods to economic 
ventures which would not only benefit governments, but also 
ease shortages and improve the quality of life in Eastern 
Europe (“La Perestroika” 1989). Symbolic events contributed 
to eased tensions.  Many Western musicians, including Ozzy 
Osborne, gathered in August of 1989 for a music and peace 
festival in the Soviet Union to promote disarmament and 
lessen tensions between East and West, receiving an 
enthusiastic reception which must have suggested future 
commercial opportunities as well (Poirette, 1989).  Article 
after article emphasized connections to be made or remade 
thanks to a more open relationship between the Soviet Union 
and the west.  For example, Soviet psychiatrists looked to 
integrate into worldwide professional organizations (Smadja, 
1989).  The possibilities must have appeared endless.     
Notable French journalist Pierre Haski, at the time head of 
Liberation’s diplomatic section, stated that closer relations 
were the key to everything, that as Moscow struggled 
through reform, it would develop a “new rapprochement with 
Europe” which would inevitably lead to more effective 
economic reform and a reduction in military forces (Haski, 
1989).  
  Closer relations with the Soviet Union were evident in 
very public displays which provided the left with excellent 
press in addition to closer relationships with Eastern 
European leftists.  Marchais traveled to Moscow, meeting 
with Gorbachev and other high-ranking Soviet officials.  He 
expressed the PCF’s support for perestroika, envisioning an 
era of greater public acknowledgment and mutually 
beneficial ties between the two parties (Leyrac, 1989, 
September 23).  In a gesture of support, Marchais’s visit 
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included trips to a few of the border republics including 
Belorussia, where he laid a wreath at the memorial to the 
World War II era massacre of Polish prisoners at Katyn by 
the Nazis.  This visit showed solidarity with the Eastern 
European communists while emphasizing the importance of 
a stable transition by making solemn gestures of 
comradeship in the borderlands. (Leyrac, 1989, September 
2).   These trips combined with Gorbachev’s own meetings, 
with both Western leaders and allies such as Honecker, 
displayed a willingness to move forward while serving as a 
leftist testament to the viability of Eastern European 
socialism (“Confiance” 1989). 
  Such leftist visions of unity constituted a very positive 
and inclusive view of reform in which German discussions 
signified progress. Meanwhile the end result of more changes 
in Eastern Europe would allow for greater communication 
with the East whose newly emerging governments could 
receive help from both the West and the Soviets.  Rhetoric 
from the left along these lines was occasionally grand and 
sweeping, lauding Gorbachev’s embrace of a continental 
vision of Eastern Europe within the larger European 
community (Drach, 1989).    Such visions tended to imagine 
France as a leader on the continent, but that was hardly a 
newly advocated concept.  Whatever its views on 
nationalism, the French left was still French.  And, given the 
French independent streak in international politics, PCF’s 
participation in government, and economic advantages, 
France could easily be seen as a logical western ambassador 
to interested Communist and former Communist 
governments.  Sometimes this potential was voiced outright.  
Alain Bocquete, PCF politician and today leader of the 23 
member (out of a total of 326 representatives) PCF led   
coalition in the French senate, suggested in October of 1989 
that perestroika was an imitation of the PCFs own 
adaptations to parliamentary government (Dupin, 1989).   
M o s t  o f t e n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  P C F s  i n t e r e s t  i n  p l a y i n g  a  b i g  
brother role to reforming Eastern European communist 
parties is most evident through the sheer enthusiasm of 
leaders such as Marchais during his travels in Eastern 
Europe, coupled with large doses of prescriptive advice along 
the line of warnings against nationalism and Jean-Paul 
Pierot’s emphasis on political compromise in Hungry.  These 
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public meetings and potential new role in working with 
Eastern European communists helped to reinforce the PCF’s 
relevance domestically where they continued to disagree with 
the budget cuts and business-oriented economic policies 
which had motivated PCF representatives to leave the 
Socialist led coalition government in 1984. 
  Beyond these hopes for the future were models of 
Europe which moved past the immediate ramifications of 
perestroika and reform to consider larger philosophical 
questions about the European political system.  Theorists 
examined state structures to determine what effect lessening 
tension and a peaceful end to the Cold War could have on 
the new framework which emerged.  This included the 
concept of the nation-state itself.  Max Wallace, a leftist 
analyst of fascism highly distrustful of American intentions, 
asserted in an article published in the March 1989 edition of 
Le Monde Diplomatique that a combination of Western 
cosmopolitanism and communist suppression of nationalism 
could create the potential for “L’Europe sans nations,” which 
would include the Soviet Union and form a strong new 
confederation based on leftist ideals reinforced by Western 
resources (Wallace, 1989).  Wallace and other political 
theorists believed that such a new paradigm could allow a 
virtuous socialist Europe to confront the problems of the 
developing world.  Marchais’s article following the fall of the 
Berlin wall included pronouncements of a new era in which a 
“renewed socialism will embrace Europe” developing 
partnerships amongst leftists through reforms in the East 
and the PCFs continued fight against injustice.  This exciting 
image of a future united Europe branded the third world as 
“the child of capitalism” calling for progress and European 
rapprochement (Marchais, 1989).  Included in the fall of the 
nation state was the potential for new constructions which 
could not be predicted.  However, the pan-European model 
receives the most detailed consideration, likely because it 
seemed the most plausible and took a path many 
intellectuals had considered before, for better or worse, 
under the guise of many different political philosophies from 
imperial autocracy to proletarian communism (Brie, 1989).  
Despite these hopes for the future, even the idealists worried 
over the ramifications of a unified European parliament, 
either because such a parliament might unfairly neglect 
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small minorities on the continent or because the controversy 
over establishing and codifying such a parliament would 
prove so straining as to sabotage the whole project (Wallace, 
1989). 
 
5. Concerns of the French Left: Capitalism and 
Nationalism 
Not all discourse from the left was so optimistic 
regarding the future of Eastern Europe.  Ambitious pan-
European projects required the correct sort of transition in 
Eastern Europe, and as 1989 concluded, many on the left 
cautioned against the dangers of the reform process.  The 
leftist press showed concern towards Eastern European 
nations’ abilities while contemplating a new Europe and 
encouraging Soviet participation. Though philosophically 
encouraging, particularly for the long-term, direct 
commentary assessing the immediate situation following 
Soviet detachment and changes in local government was 
often stark and distrustful.   This distrust focused upon the 
intentions of reformers or their susceptibility to a more 
American style of capitalism influenced by Western neo-
liberals (referring to the Reagan and Thatcher 
administrations in particular).  The fear was, as Le Monde 
Diplomatique editor Chavier indicated in his article “Neo-
liberal Fascinations,” these Western leaders failed to 
understand the fragile situation of East Europe as well as 
the nature of Eastern European reforms as the restructuring 
of communism.  Such misunderstandings, Chavier stated, 
led to capitalist economic policies which encouraged 
corporate or nationalist autocrats (Chavier, 1989). 
  Reform could be positive, but the French left criticized 
its direction.   Solutions which addressed economic problems 
would not necessarily change society to avoid social injustice 
or prevent the emergence of separatist movements.   Even 
though the collapse of communist governments on a massive 
scale and the complete dissolution of the Soviet Union were 
rarely, if ever, considered, by the end of 1989 many 
prominent leftists acknowledged the volatility of the Soviet 
situation (Ferro, “La Moment” 1989).  Gradually aware of the 
extent to which Soviet influence could disappear from 
Eastern Europe at a time of major change from Poland to 
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Bulgaria, French leftists had advice and warnings for new 
fledgling governments.  The left tended to favor democracy, 
thus their support for representation, in the wake of Soviet 
reform and withdrawal, but the meaning of democracy was 
itself a question. 
  In August of 1989, following the establishment of 
representative institutions in Poland, the opening article of 
Le Monde Diplomatique announced that change was 
inevitable.  The result of this change was to be democracy, 
but the author, Ignacio Ramonet, later to become editor-in-
chief, questioned what else came with democracy, 
particularly capitalism.  Ramonet was willing to move 
beyond debating the possibility of major reforms in Eastern 
Europe, assume these reforms to be in progress, and 
progress straight to an attack on the assumption that 
representative government in Eastern Europe implied a 
capitalist economy.  And what, if capitalism was part of the 
move toward democracy, would become of the Communist 
parties of Eastern Europe so long in power and surely not 
without local support (Ramonet, 1989)? 
  This question reflects a fear of American-British 
incursion onto the continent in a new form, as well as a 
belief that Eastern European states lacked the resources and 
political experience to undergo such a drastic change 
without becoming repressive. The importance of dialog 
between East and West is emphasized once again in these 
encouragements.  Capitalism introduced to a developing 
country lacking widespread infrastructure could lead to 
corporate dictatorship, the more difficult to avoid without 
past experience in representative government (Cassler, 
1989).  Given the power of the Russian corporate “oligarchs,” 
their influence during the 1990s, and charges of corruption 
from the Russian government and press, these concerned 
assessments appear prophetic in hindsight. 
  Eastern European countries’ lack of experience with 
open elections strengthened French concerns for Eastern 
Europe and reinforced leftists’ cautionary approach to 
democratization.  They cited examples already developing 
such as the Hungarian parliament established in late 1989 
in which little was being accomplished due to procedural 
confusion and an inability to form consensus (Gradvohl, 
1989).  If such institutions could not establish themselves, 
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then democracy might indeed give way to a unifying autocrat 
or a ruling class dictated by a military-industrial complex 
instead of elected officials.  Warnings against recklessness 
and calls for restraint suggest an increasing sense of 
acceptance that rapprochement with the west necessarily 
implied expanding some form of capitalism into Eastern 
Europe (Julien, 1990).  Many of these views from the left are 
not strict anti-capitalist proscriptions but support 
compromise, directing the new governments of Eastern 
Europe towards a mix of capitalism and socialism 
resembling continental Western European frameworks while 
maintaining or incorporating communist principles of 
equality of social justice.  
French leftists realized the economic needs of Eastern 
Europe; however, they connected these with social needs and 
injustices as well as a poor business model.  Furthermore, 
they could reasonably assert that Eastern European 
governments would need to institute both social and 
economic reforms carefully over a broad spectrum of society.  
The new governments following the 1989 revolutions, such 
as the Solidarity led Polish coalition, gathered a wide variety 
of people and interests in order gain power.  The French left 
could argue the importance of satisfying these numerous 
social and economic needs based on maintaining the 
stability of the new government (Patel, 1989).  However this 
was certainly no open embrace of capitalism.  Fears of 
capitalist speculation in new markets such as Hungary 
fueled concern that a bloom of foreign investment without 
sufficient government oversight could endanger socialist 
parties and the wages of the working class (Salsac, 1989). 
  The final major point of concern expressed by the 
French left was the emergence or reemergence of strong 
nationalist movements.  Realistic assessments from the left 
supported reform but warned that after so many years of 
repressing nationalist sentiment without effectively 
alleviating social problems, the Soviet government must plan 
against inevitable nationalist agitation as control softened 
(Kis, 1989).  Gorbachev’s hopes that perestroika would ease 
some nationalist tensions, particularly in the Caucuses and 
the Ukraine, ran up against the strength of nationalist 
sentiment which the French left recognized (“Tensions”1989). 
The destabilization of the Balkan states, which Le Monde 
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Diplomatique’s regional feature described as “a fragile 
mosaic,” erupting as the Yugoslav government crumbled was 
and would continue to be a topic of concern for all Europe 
(“Les Balkons” 1989).  French papers printed exposés on 
nationalist movements in the USSR complete with brief 
histories and details of the conflicts between local minorities, 
such as liberation correspondent Giles Schiller’s August 10th 
piece on the Soviet Republic of Moldavia (Schiller, 1989). 
Conflicts within the Soviet Union threatened its breakup and 
redoubled concern over nationalist resurgence.  
  In Southeastern Europe, the number and status of 
minorities left Muslims, Turks, and others in Romania and 
Bulgaria open to the abuses developing in Yugoslavia.   
Nationalism could taint democracy with the specter of state 
legislated discrimination and pogroms (Chiclet, 1989).   
Economic disparities, such as those between republics in the 
Soviet Union which the French left considered significant 
challenges for Soviet reformers, gave rise to dissent.  For the 
PCF these “Inequalities of the Soviet Federation,” as 
l’Humanite  journalist Bernard Frederick described them, 
represented the drama of capitalism playing out on a 
particularly unfortunate stage (Frederick, 1989). What effect 
newly created representative institutions would have on the 
process was unclear.  Reports from the PCF regarding Soviet 
elections stated they were fair, the result of meaningful 
positive reforms; however local elections also highlighted the 
economic and separatist problems which necessitated reform 
in the first place (Pierot, 1989, September 2).  As the French 
left sought to befriend Eastern Europe, leftist intellectuals 
urged caution, fearing the lessons of the 20th century would 
be lost on governments and peoples who saw the results of 
Western political development without understanding the 
continuing social struggles experienced in the process of 
creating and maintaining democracy against stratification, 
totalitarianism, and discrimination. 
 
6. Conclusions: The French Left Hopes for the Future 
The French left was and is diverse.  The strong popular 
support for socialist and communist parties in France 
relative to the United States and Great Britain allows for a 
broad spectrum of viewpoints within leftist political circles.   
Unquestionably, the revolutions of 1989 marked a time of 
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drastic change in the European political landscape.   
However, during that year, even as governments fell along 
with the wall, hopes and expectations for a stronger left in 
the future of European politics could be read even from the 
most strident PCF leaders who feared the corruption of 
communist ideology by Western capitalists.  PCF infighting 
and some of the very strong idealistic statements made by 
PCF leaders might lead one to think that the PCF was blindly 
supporting Moscow’s party line.  While the headlines of 
L’Humanite give some credence to this idea, the arguments 
contained within these articles, the thorough reasoning and 
idealism expressed within the whole text, reveal genuine 
belief as does the persistence of these French communists in 
the PCF beyond the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss 
of their financial support.   Also, as important as the PCF 
was to the French left and its view of Eastern Europe, the 
socialist government’s rapprochement, the journalists at 
Liberation, the intellectuals published in Le Monde 
Diplomathique, and the crowds of French people gathered to 
applaud the visit of Gorbachev speak against any idea that 
the complete collapse of the communist bloc was inevitable 
and obvious to westerners. 
  The French left generally embraced perestroika, 
acknowledging the major economic and social problems 
present in Eastern Europe.  Reform was encouraged with the 
hope that the West could serve as a model while the East 
could act as a strong ally in shaping the future of socialism, 
providing support for those Westerners seeking a more fair 
and adequate social compact between citizen and 
government.  In these hopes for successful reform, images of 
a closer Europe, we see the dreams of the French left, not 
only for the future of Eastern Europe or an expended 
European community, but for France as well.  Language 
from the right heralded the fall of communism, not only 
communist governments but of a political philosophy which 
remained the embodiment of ideal government for significant 
numbers of Frenchmen.   The problems which Eastern 
Europe experienced, and against which the French left 
warned, were the local issues of the French left writ large 
upon the world: racism, religious intolerance, materialism, 
unfair wages, corrupt oligarchies, rabid nationalism, and the 
dominance of foreign powers.  
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  Despite the regimes they sometimes defended, these 
voices from the left were not seeking to prop up corrupt 
dictatorships indefinitely.  However the core tenets of the left 
from Mitterrand to the PCF were shared responsibility, 
liberty, and duty to others.  In pursuing the ultimate victory 
of these ideals the French left sometimes ignored blatant 
injustice in the present in order to build towards a better 
future, but other times they decried these injustices even 
from close allies.  They warned against the effects of 
unrestricted capitalism on the poor and believed, as the PS, 
the PCF and other parties of the left continue to, that the 
aim of government should be the good of all citizens.  On 
November 11th 1989, L’Humanite  published an article by 
Jean-Claude Gayssot, PCF legislator and, in 1990, drafter of 
The Gayssot Act which criminalized Holocaust denial in 
France.  The article entitled “I am a Happy Communist” 
welcomed reforms in Germany, arguing that democracy and 
freedom would move Germany towards socialism while 
helping that country avoid the pitfalls of capitalism.  His 
conclusion, “Capitalism is not the future of the world,” 
reveals what the genuine proponents of socialism and 
communism saw as important and inevitable in 1989.  Not 
changes in government, but the ideal future of a fair society 
(Gayssott, 1989).  
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